Author’s name
The Suez Crisis
This paper will analyze the belligerents of Suez Crisisregarding the legibility of their political objectives and militaryinvasion. It is also known as the tripartite aggression. Theprincipal nations involved were the United Kingdom, France, andIsrael. They planned the offensive against Egypt due to manypolitical reasons1.Israel was the first country to invade, then followed by Britain andFrance. The primary aims of executing the war were to ensure that theWest regained their control of the Suez Canal and the removal ofGamal Abdul Nasser from the presidency. The three belligerents wereable to executive an operation by their militaries. All the nationsinvolved in the Suez Canal invasion were driven by economic andpolitical interests which would be of benefit to the interests of theindividual nations.
Israel was one of the nations with political interests on theSuez Canal. The Israeli’s interests in the Suez Canal developed dueto the need to transport goods and people through the Mediterraneanto the Red Sea without interference by the Egyptian government. TheIsraeli government was unhappy about restrictions placed on theircargo thus heightening the quest for control of the canal and thestraits of Tiran. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel’sshipment of goods was mainly controlled by the authorities of Egypt.Egypt conducted various searches and imposed restrictions on theships, and this was received badly by the Israeli government. It wascontrary to the provisions of Article 1 of the 1888 Convention onSuez Canal. Again, Fedayeen raided Israel, and G.A Nasser was seen astheir primary sponsor thus escalating the quests for war. The attacksby the Egyptian authorities were conducted on civilians almost at alltimes, and this was not received well by the Israeli government thuscontributing to the urge for war. Therefore, Israel had to carry outretaliatory operations against the invaders and their supporters. G.ANasser had interests in making Egypt a leading nation among theArabic Nations and therefore based his strategies on control of theSuez Canal as a way of gaining power2.Initially, Nasser was targeting Britain in most of his speeches butlater after an agreement with Britain about the opening of the SuezCanal Israel became a principle enemy of Egypt. This explanation,therefore, gives information regarding the heightened tension betweenthe two nations and the political objectives of the Israeliinvasion3.Israel’s military operation suited their political goal, and theywere able to execute a war that in the end would benefit them intothe resumption of their shipping routes and enhancing their economy.
The decision by G.A Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal wasthreatening the British interests of economic and military gain. Thismove by the Egyptian government had what angered the Britons andprompted them to engage in the operation4.The British Prime Minister, Eden, was pressurized significantly bythe Conservatives MPs who insisted that war was the best option ofwinning domination over the Suez Canal. They were directly comparingthe 1956 happenings with those of the 1938 Agreements in Munich.Again, the United States of America did not support Britain in theirwoes over the Canal nationalization the Britons decided to engageEgypt in direct military warfare. The trick had worked previously inobtaining colonies. It was mainly staged because they wanted toprotect the prestigious benefits they got from the region. The Iraqileaders, King Feisal II, and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, urged theBritish prime minister to retaliate in a harsh tone because that wasa breach of treaty agreements. The biggest problem that troubled Edenwas the American position on the matter. To avoid angeringWashington, and the Arab relations with Britain, the Britishgovernment, opted to involve in a covert military operation with theFrench and Israel. Britain’s objective was to regain control of theSuez Canal which was the main conduit for their access to primarycolonies and transportation of vital treasures such as oil andminerals from Africa and also to gain control over Egypt5.Therefore, the primary political objectives for the Britishinvolvement was reversing the Suez Canal nationalization. They wanteda guarantee that the canal maintained an international significance6.To meet their goals, the Britons were fast in engaging the militaryas a tool for achieving their political and economic objectives.
The French and the Egyptians were political rivals. Therivalry seemed to have been triggered by the Algerian rebellion whichthreatened to weaken the French domination over its colonies in theNorthern part of Africa. One of the factors therefore that led to thedevelopment of the rivalry between the French and the Egyptians wasthe fact that the Egyptians aided the Algerians during theirrebellion thus interfering with the French political ambitions. G.ANasser pitied the Algerian rebels and gave them the green light tospring up operation bases in his capital, Cairo7.It was not enough Nasser also decided to fund the Algerians aidingin their day-to-day activities. He supplied weapons and intelligenceinformation to them so that they would succeed in their rebelliousactivities against the French. On Cairo radio, G.A Nasser publicallymade anti-French sentiments. He condemned the barbaric occupation ofAlgeria and wished that defeat came to the way of the French. It was,therefore, important for the French to seek help from common enemiesof Egypt to oust Gamal Abdul Nasser from the throne. The Frenchpresident, Guy Mollet prioritized the invasion operation. The Frenchpolitical objective was to emerge victorious over the rebelliousAlgeria, and Cairo became one of the hurdles towards the achievement.The French were also enraged by the decision of nationalizing theSuez Canal. The French public supported their premiere in theresponse when he said that Nasser could not be allowed to make suchaggressive decisions that threatened national peace. Due to this, theCabinet of France concluded on a military move on Egypt8.The French sent an emissary to Britain informing them of thedecision, and if the British were interested, they would hand insupport or directly engage as well. Just like Britain, France wasalso unhappy about the indecisiveness by President Dwight D.Eisenhower over the matter. It meant that the military office was inline with their political objective. The Western European nationswere among the principal beneficiaries of the Suez Canal. It was amajor passageway for their ship cargo and an open passage to theIndian Ocean.
The Israelis government had the right to fight for the SuezCanal. This was proper due to the economic status of the youngnation. Israel had to improve its economy and enhance its politicalpower thus through the opening of the canal the Israelis would haveeasy access to the East which would not only have enhanced itseconomic power, but also its political strength. Egypt was a threatand great hurdle towards Israelis missions of improving the nationalimage. To protect their ambitions, it was proper for the Israelis toface Egypt. G.A Nasser had secured the purchase of arms from theSoviets (Czechoslovakia). Egypt had a major supply of modern andpowerful Russian ammunitions. Stalin tanks, Illusions, MiGs, andother essential tools of war. This was the first sign that theEgyptian were planning to attack Israel. The Israeli government wasworried of the Egyptians because earlier, The Cairo government hadinterfered with the Gaza raid which was scheduled by the Israeliforces. The Suez issue would, therefore, provided a goldenopportunity for the Israeli to launch a revenge mission for politicalsatisfaction. The threat Egypt posed to Israel significantlyincreased by 1956, and there was a need for action9.The intensity of Fidayeen raids was rising leading to increasedfrequency and violence in the raids. The Israelis had to act in aquick manner if they ever had ambitions of protecting theirinterests. Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel and hisgovernment had mainly four political objectives. Firstly, for him towin the war, he had to eject G.A Nasser from political power, a movethat would mark the defeat of Egypt and therefore ease Israeli’saccess to the precious transport route to the Indian Ocean. Nasserhad become a threat to Israel. He had the prowess in igniting hispeople’s desire and pride he was zealous in his leadership, andthe Egyptians began to realize their significance in the Middle East.The leadership of Nasser in enlightening the Egyptians was a massivethreat to Israel, and if they had to win, they had to eliminate him.The strip of Gaza had been under the occupation of Egyptians sincethe war of 1948 between Arabs and Israelis. Therefore, Israel wantedto obtain the strip’s control. Thirdly, the Egyptians had blockedthe Aqaba Gulf. Israel could only end the blockade by gaining accessthrough the Straits of Tiran. The straits were vital to Israel’soperation and shipments10.Therefore, the objective was to eliminate the Egyptian threat overthe Sinai11.The army of Egypt had control over Sinai region and Israel needed tosecure it to maintain a requisite existence due to its young life.The interests in the Sinai region also added to the various triggersof war over the Suez Canal. Sinai would be considered as an Israelterritory if they won. The legitimacy in the nationalization of SuezCanal was questioned by the three belligerents, though Egypt was firmthat their stand was legal, and that they had the right to have totalcontrol over the canal. The Egyptians also said that the decisionwould not interfere with navigation freedom of the Canal12.The two issues were among the factors which led to the war. Franceand Britain knew that nationalization was not an issue big enough tobring forth military intervention. They resulted in trying toconvince everyone that Nasser would be unable to effect the freeshipping on the Canal. Egypt did not close the Canal even after thecombined efforts of Britain and France. The United States of Americasaw no need of supporting Britain and France because the war was seenas a colonialism extension. Support by the U.S to any of the nationsinvolved in a war for the Suez Canal would discredit PresidentEisenhower. His decision of staying away from the war was right. Anyinvolvement would have threated his bid for the second time inoffice. Other bodies such as the United Nations did not see anyproblem with the decision made by Egypt. Because everybody haddeserted them, France and Britain embarked on a quest to prove to anynation with military supremacy that there was a need for militaryinvolvement for the liberation of the Suez Canal. It is the primaryreason why they engaged in a secretive but egocentric decision toinvade and try to oust G.A Nasser13.The nations drew their justification from the matter of Suez Canalnationalization which to other international bodies and countries,was not worth the aggressive move. Political objectives include boththe legitimate and illegitimate ones in the eyes of internationalcommunity14.
TheFrench, British and Israel engaged in the military interventions toguard their political interests thus justifying the thesis statement.Suez Canal had important values which include the 40% in shipping,an international commercial level15.The business routes between Liverpool and Calcutta for Britain andthose between Marseille and Basra for France had a rough average of16,500 miles by transiting through the Cape of Good Hope. Thedistance would drop to around six thousand miles by the Canal thusthe need for the liberation of the Suez Canal. Malaya produced rubberwhich was supplied to North Europe through the Canal. Chrome fromEast Africa, wool, and wheat were from Australia, manganese, tea andcotton from India, Pakistan’s jute, and importantly oil was fromthe Middle East. On average, the Middle East recovered 180 milliontons of oil in a year. In a day, barrels of oil around 1.5 millionwere crossing the Suez Canal to Europe. Three-quarters of all thetransits through the Canal to Europe were mainly oil carriers. Morethan 80% of the oil which Britain and France depended on came fromthe Middle East. The evidence of the economic advantages hindered bythe closure and strict regulation of the canal is, therefore,suitable enough to explain the importance of the push to liberate thecanal. The canal was much needed for the development of the west thusthe need for its opening by allowing free movement of water vessels.
The stake Britain had in the Suez Canal was enormous to losetoo quickly. They had 44% of the shares. It meant that Britainreceived huge revenues from its proceeds. Nationalization of theCanal would deny Britain the profits and ultimately create hugeproblems on her economy16.The relationship that the USSR was developing with Gamal Abdul Nasserwas a worry to Britain because they feared that the friendship wouldinterfere with the allies of Britain such as the Middle East oilsuppliers17.Britain also feared that Nasser would interfere with oil passage. Themove which would effect to Egypt’s decision to influence SaudiArabia and Syria to halt their oil supply to the Western Europe.Majorly, France and Britain did not want to see the technical controlof transit along the Suez Canal by the USSR. Britain was also afraidthat Egypt’s control of oil flow from the Middle East would costthem close to seventy-one million dollars in revenue. Again, the USSRwould have an economic advantage over Western Europe18.It is a political interest which would later prompt the invasion ofEgypt. Therefore, it confirms the thesis statement. Table 1 belowindicates the six leading Middle East nations supplying oil to theWest. The total tons produced by the six countries were 115 millionin a year. 74 million tons were transported through the Canal.
Westernoil shipments in 1955 (In million tons)
VIA THE CANAL | VIA PIPELINE | |
IRAQ | 4 | 25 |
SAUDI ARABIA | 8 | 16 |
KUWAIT | 44 | – |
QATAR | 5 | – |
IRAN | 10 | – |
BAHREIN | 3 | – |
TOTAL | 71 | 41 |
Table1: The table shows the importance of Suez Canal on the Western Europeeconomy
Itgives reasons why those European nations decided to engagemilitarily. Another important role that Suez Canal played for Britainwas the access to its military bases in East Africa, Commonwealthfriends of the Pacific and major allies19.
There were some private shareholders of French origin in theSuez Canal Company who needed protection from their country. Theyowned 56% shares in the Company. The National image was vital toFrance now that they had given up in the Nazi war of 1940. To achievethat status, the French engaged in the Indochina war. They wereaggressive and ferocious terming it a revolutionary war. Again, thewar presented them with surprises. They disastrously lost ending upto lose the colony as well. Their defeat was at Diene Bien Phou thisbattle was proving to be a communist triumph. Mao Zedong had emergedvictorious earlier, the loss of France in Indochina, also, the armythat overthrew the monarchy of Egypt who were great allies of theBritish, among the fighters was Gamal Abdel Nasser and its leaderMuhammad Neguib. These victories were viewed as those of communistnations and allies20.Afterward, followed the Algerian revolutionary war which Nassersupported. Just how important was Algeria? More than one millionsettlers from France occupied the Coastal Algeria owning large tractsof land. They also resided in the main cities of Algeria21.These groups of French and the Algerian- French people would notallow the authority to be given to the vast masses who they deemeduncivilized. Algerian rebels established the Front de LiberationNationale (FLN) to oust the French.22To thwart the influence of USSR and its communist friends, the Frenchfelt like they had to act and that is why they engaged their militaryto suit the political objectives.
Operational planning and the steps used in executing theoperation prove the accomplishment of the joint Armies. Earlier,Eden had proposed the deployment of the sixteenth Independent BrigadeGroup so that they could seize the Canal region. After the initialplot, there would follow another group of thousands of Britishsoldiers to occupy the area23.The idea was fruitless because of the insufficient naval and airliftprowess. Then, there was input by the chiefs of staff in Britain whosaid that if the primary reason behind the move was to oust G.ANasser, then it was not enough just to occupy the Canal Zone. Theythen proposed a Contingency Plan. The plan proposed seizure of PortSaid and then subsequent capture of the zone. It also included thebombing of the large economic centers for civilians and destroyingvital Egyptian infrastructure. When the plan was given to thecommanders of the task force, they were the group mandated to executeit and ensure British needs are implemented it was identified thatthe bombing suggestions would be fruitless in overturning thegovernment of Gamal Abdul Nasser. They proposed that the primarymilitary objective was not only the destruction of Egypt’sinfrastructure or occupation of the Canal Zone but also ensuring thatthe entire army of Egypt is defeated significantly24.The task force commanders came up with a counter-proposal namedOperation Musketeer. The difference between the Contingency plan andthe Musketeer operation was their centers of focus25.Musketeer operation was the best option in such a situation. Theprocess aimed at focusing more on Nasser’s army as opposed to theprevious plan, the Contingency Plan, which saw that the major powercame from vital points such as infrastructure. It meant that therewould be a need for more troops and arms. Invasion of Port Said wasdropped, and they resulted to Alexandria as the main point of entry.Attack by air and airborne operations were majorly chosen forengaging the Egyptian army26.It was also to be employed in the West Cairo battle, which was to bethe major decisive basis. Because of the much involvements andmachinery needed to realize the plan, Britain saw the need to involveother countries this was meant to reduce much expenditure. Franceadded thirty thousand troops to the fifty thousand that Britain had.Musketeer Commander would be a Briton, General Charles Keightley andwas to be deputized by a French, one Admiral Pierre Barjot, from theFrench navy. The British Prime Minister Anthony Eden aimed atprotecting the international community from harm of any manner. Therewere some suggestions to review the activities within the French andBritish group. Barjot contemplated the matter and later proposed theresumption to the previous British plan which had limited objectivesand that it would not pose a greater international tension.Therefore, they had a choice of modifying operation Musketeer. Therewere objections from two generals, Andre Beaufre and Hugh Stockwell,a French and a Briton respectively27.They were from the land forces of their respective countries. Becauseof that, the decision to resume to the original plan was made. Theprevious plan had an interest in bombing strategic places. It alsoincluded a more sustainable budget28.
Operation Revise was the final suggestion which they opted toimplement. The operation was to be steered in three phases. Firstly,they had to be superior in the air. Secondly, they were to focus onthe destruction of essential infrastructure for the civilians. Thesecond phase was to be conducted for ten days nonstop. Thirdly, theFrench and British army would do an amphibious and airborne operationto seize the Canal Zone. The idea of defeating the Egyptian army didnot surface whatsoever29.Eden ran out of options to start a military invasion and therefore hehad to look for means of justifying the move to the very muchpressurizing international community. His answers laid with Israel.The nearly eight-year-old nation had planned to fight Egypt for overa year ago. Theirs was an operation called Kadesh. The principal aimof the operation was the liberation of Sinai, prevention of theblockage of Straits of Tiran and disallow insurgent haven in Gaza.The Kadesh operation was first intended to gain superiority in theair, utilize the advantage their armed forces had on mobility, and toencircle finally the army of Egypt in the areas they intended toinvade and liberate. When the Israelis realized that there would besupport from the British and French side, they agreed to meetsecretly with representatives from the two nations in the French cityof Sevres30.It is at this meeting that the nations thought of the best way tofool the international community into agreeing with their invasion.The meeting tells that there were mutual interests and agreementsbetween the belligerents.
The invasion protocol established a timeline for the operation,which on the 29th of October, 1956 Israel was to invadeEgypt and in the end it would appear as if they were threateningshipment freedom along the Suez Canal. Then on the next day, Britainand France were to condemn the move. They would also demand thewithdrawal of both Egyptians and Israelis from the Canal Zone31.The demand was to be accompanied with a twenty-four-hour ultimatumthat if they did not withdraw, France and Britain would personallyintervene. The Israeli attack was objectively correct as it resultedin the adjustments of dates of actual ambush and became a proper planthat would allow them to meet their objectives. As planned, theIsraelis commenced Operation Kadesh at around 1500 hours. Theystarted with strikes from the air where they destroyed Egyptian modesof communication. It was promptly followed by the ground attack onSinai. They were achieving their goal over the first forty-eighthours. The operation went as planned and the Israelis achieved theirgoal. The British and France aired their ultimatum and on 31stOctober, they struck. There was grave criticism from theinternational community against Israel’s decision. The USSR and theUnited States were for the involvement of resolutions from the UnitedNations to thwart the war. The Egyptian army was alone in the fight.Nasser’s army was still intact and active. Later in the evening,Phase I of Operation Revise was ignited32.It meant that there was a possibility of the Egyptian army beingtrapped in the middle at Sinai in case the Western army would beginthe ground attack. Nasser knew his major stronghold was the army.Therefore, he decided to retreat them from the Sinai33.Hecommanded the army to withdraw to the West of the Canal Zone. It isone of the moves which allowed the Israelis to achieve their Kadeshgoal. Operation Revise Phase I was successful because the British andFrench fighters had destroyed much of Egyptian air force with over200 Egyptian warplanes being demolished. The first thirty-six hourshad done many damages to the Egyptian army. The second phase startedwhere the Anglo-French troops begun striking the civilianinfrastructure. As the second phase was underway, they were alsopaving the way for the beginning of Phase III34.When phase III started, the majority of paratroops were the BritishThird Parachute Battalion Group. Their airborne strike was mainly toaccomplish three objectives. The first one was to secure the CanalZone, which they were able to realize quickly. Secondly, they wantedto seize the Gamil airfield. It was successful though it proved aproblem for the subsequent operations since the field was in badnature. The third aim was to curb the facilities of Port Said. It wasa bit hard for them because the Egyptian army was engaging them aswell. There was serious resistance in the city. As the battle was atits peak, the political developments from outside world mountedpressure on the French and Britons to a cease-fire. The UnitedNations asked them to cease their operation effective from 0200 hourson the 7th of November, the same year. Because thealliance of Britain, France and Israel had some political objectives,they were able to plan their invasion wittily they achieved some ofthe aims, for instance, Israeli ousted the Egyptian occupation ofSinai35.There was increased pressure from the United Nations, United Statesand USSR prompting the ceasefire36.The expedition by the Anglo- French alliance in the battle againstEgypt resulted in the humiliation of Western Europe because of policyissues, nevertheless, to realize their political objectives theysuccessfully executed a military operation. Israel was the nationwhich fully was victorious in achieving its military ambitions in thewar and therefore achieving some of its political ambitions.
In previous years, the European countries had engaged in too muchwarfare, ranging from the First World War, Second World War,revolutionary wars of states that were seeking independence fromcolonial masters, the European monarchical wars, the civil wars andmany others. It implies that Europe had enough experience to engagein warfare of any type. Looking at the way the Egyptian invasion wasplanned with consideration to the alliance between France andBritain, the inclusion of Israel and the last joint militaryengagement, it confirms that an enemy of my enemy is my friend, andtherefore we can join hands in trying to finish our shared enemy. TheEuropean culture shaped the way military operated in war37.First off, the inception of colonialism was in Europe, and they hadsome superiority complex over the minor races and nations. Forinstance, the Britons colonized most parts of Africa, America, andAsia. Winning the revolutionary battles in resisting colonies was asignificant motivator for the colonialists, and so they believed thatthey had strong armies to conquer any place. There was a commonculture in European nations when it comes to warfare, right fromplanning, tricks of engagement, manpower and the split of engagingphases. The way Britain and France executed Operation Revise tells itall. So the culture of superiority prompted the nations to run themilitary operation which was in line with their political objectives.
The belligerents had enough resources and manpower to engagetheir army in the war. Britain alone managed to raise fifty thousandsoldiers. France added thirty thousand thus increasing the number toa total of eighty thousand troops which was not inclusive of theIsraelis who had first planned to engage alone. It means that theyhad a ready army38.In any military power, the most important parameters that contributeto its strength is the economy, the army size, technologicaladvancements and many other factors like the morale, good leadership,bravery in the citizens of the respective nation, militarymotivation, and others. In addition to the number of soldiers, theyhad warplanes, ships, sophisticated arms like tankers, submarines,binoculars, military gowns and protective gears. The joint militarywas able to defeat the Egyptian army at the Sinai they retreated tothe West of Canal Zone, and many civilians of Egypt lost their lives.The Operation Revision had been implemented well because they wentthrough with phase I and phase II39.Where they had gained air control and were headed for the Canal Zone.The military operation was overturned by the international communityinterventions led by the United States and United Nations. If theyall had taken a neutral ground, the action would have borne theintended fruits. In a nutshell, the economic strength that Britainand France had helped them in executing the war. The vast number ofsoldiers also contributed a lot and the union with Israel. The plansat Sevres convention was ingenious though later, they were realizedand a decision made at the United Nations meeting helped stop thewar. Their strength was enough to start a military operation, mainlyto guard and achieve their political objective40.
The reasons for the belligerents to execute military operationswere sound and valid. For instance, the Suez Canal was a waterwaywhich many nations, ranging from Europe, the Middle East, the FarEast, Africa and Australia. Previously, Egypt had willingly agreed ona treaty about the terms of the operation of the Suez Canal, but theyfaulted the deal. A country will always strive to uphold its economicstrength, and that is the main reason why Britain did not want therevenues which it got from the Suez Canal Company be stopped41.Again the waterway was supplying the entire Western Europe with oil.Economic muscles have many benefits, one, the military strengthdepended on it for supplies, it brought Britain respect from othernations, developed strong political influence, and improved financialpower. Britain was, therefore, right in try and protect itsinterests. At the same time, the United States did not support itlongtime ally, Britain, because it also had personal interests in theMiddle East and maintaining an international image of neutrality.France had lost too many battles to its colonies, and it wasimperative for them to keep a territory in Algeria. Therefore, anythreat that came on their way had to be eliminated, besides that, italso was benefiting much through the Suez Canal, and oil supplied viapipeline was less compared to that provided through shipping acrossthe Canal42.This reason justifies their actions. Israel was a struggling nation,and it had to expand its small territory. Also, for other countriesto recognize your strength, you have to succeed in battle. TheStraits of Tiran were vital for Israel, and because Gamal AbdulNasser had blocked them, Israel had to act. The reasons justifiedwere important for the three nations to protect their politicalinterests. That is why they succeeded in executing a militaryoperation43.
In the days after the Suez Crisis, France and Britain losttheir international image as global powers because the purportedwinner was Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser’s aim of making Egypt anArabic world power came to pass because of the Suez Crisis. Cairoemerged as a victor in the protection of their interests andachieving great honor in the Arab world. Arabs were happy a hero wasamongst them. A hero who had conquered colonial masters. Meetingmilitary and political objectives was easy for Israel because,technically, it used Anglo-French alliance and later dumped them forinternational humiliation44.The success in materializing the military invasion was a biggerachievement for Britain, Israel, and France but in every war, thereare usually consequences suffered by both the victor and thedefeated.
The United Nation’s Security Council held meetings to actupon the Israeli attacks on Egypt. Then the succeeding invasions bythe Anglo-French forces. G.A Nasser had asked for diplomaticassistance from the United States because of its influence on theUnited Nations. Because of this, there was the formation of the firstUnited Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)45.The ceasefire and the emergency force were mainly due to the effortsby Lester .B. Pearson, a Canadian External Affairs Secretary. Also,Dag Hammarskjold, who was the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations. These efforts helped quell the situation in Egypt. TheSoviet Union also called for United Nations action because Egypt wastheir principal ally.46TheUSSR was selling arms to Egypt. Therefore, for any politicallyorchestrated war, there is usually a political solution. In the SuezCrisis, the leading solutions came from the political endeavors.
In conclusion, the military stands taken by the variousnations on the Suez Canal issue was important. All the nations wereinterested in protecting their interests thus leading to the militaryevents. The thesis statement confirms that the main belligerents inthe crisis were successful in executing their military operation.Based on the objectives that they had, it was important to engageEgypt in battle. It takes great lengths for nations to protect theirgross interests. My opinion is that the Suez Crisis happened for aspecific reason and purpose. It was to serve a huge lesson forindecisiveness when preparing for war. Britain and France learnedtheir lesson the hard way through humiliation47.They were not sure about the position of the United States which wasthen a powerful nation, and whose inclusion in the war would have ledto an easily achieved success. Also, the Soviet Union took the samestand as the U.S. It is important to find amicable solutions to anyproblem that promotes instability and threatens peace. TheIsraeliThere are usually people who strive to bring peace andunderstanding between quarreling parties. The Canadian Minister andUnited Nations Secretary General were of vital help to the ceasefire.Humanity is precious, and we are tasked to protect it with everythingwe have. A threat to humankind can cause chaos. As humans, we oughtto ensure we maintain peace in the entire world. Problems can besolved through negotiations, not warfare48.
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12McCauley, Brian. 2011. "The Limits of Soviet and American Power." Journal of Contemporary History (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 16: 777-800. Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260346.
13 Richardson, Louise. 2016. International Journal (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 47: 370-401. Accessed May 6, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202764.
14 Collins, Brian C. 2011. "Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956." Small Wars Journal (Small Wars Foundation.). Accessed May 5, 2016.
15 Hart, B. H. Liddel. 1957. "Operation Musketeer." The Observer (1901- 2003) 8.
16Holland, Matthew. 2011. The Suez Canal. NC. Accessed May 7, 2016.
17 Dietil, Ralphe. 2008. "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?" Modern History Journal 260-288.
Doley, Haward J. 2013. "Great Britain`s `Last Battle` in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the SuezCrisis of 1956." The Review of International History (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 11: 486-517. Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106046.
18 Browne, O`Brien. 2005. "Long shadow of the Suez Crisis." The Quarterly Journal of Military History 74.
19 Merry, Wayne. 2006. "The Ghost of Suez." American Conservative 20.
20 Varble, Derrek. 2014. The Suez Crisis. Osprey. Accessed May 6, 2016.
21 Ziv, Guy. 2010. "Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance." Journal of Contemporary History 406-429.
22 Levey, Zach. n.d. "Anglo-Israeli Strategic Relations." Middle Eastern Studies (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 31. Accessed May 7, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283761.
23 2014. "Developments of the Quarter: Comment and Chronology." Middle East Journal, (Middle East Institute) 11: 63-91.
24 Holland, Matthew. 2011. The Suez Canal. NC. Accessed May 7, 2016.
25 Varble, Derrek. 2014. The Suez Crisis. Osprey. Accessed May 6, 2016.
26 Browne, O`Brien. 2005. "Long shadow of the Suez Crisis." The Quarterly Journal of Military History 74.
27 Dietl, Ralph. 2008. "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?" Journal of Contemporary History 259-278.
28 Merry, Wayne. 2006. "The Ghost of Suez." American Conservative 20.
Mihai, Adrian. 2011. "THE SUEZ CANAL MILITARY ANGLO-FRENCH-ISRAELI INTERVENTION FROM 1956." February.
29 Hahn, Peter L. 2011. The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956:Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War. University of North Carolina Press. Accessed May 6, 2016.
30 Lucas, W. Scott. 2013. "Redefining the Suez `Collusion`." Middle Eastern Studies 88-112.
31 McCauley, Brian. 2011. "The Limits of Soviet and American Power." Journal of Contemporary History (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 16: 777-800. Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260346
32 Merry, Wayne. 2006. "The Ghost of Suez." American Conservative 20.
33 West, Gordon. 1957. "OPERATION MUSKETEER." Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994) 34.
Zive, Guy. 2010. "Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance." Journal of Modern History 406-429.
34 Mihai, Adrian. 2011. "THE SUEZ CANAL MILITARY ANGLO-FRENCH-ISRAELI INTERVENTION FROM 1956." February.
35 Tal, David. 2012. "Israel`s Road to the 1956 War." International Journal of Middle East Studies (Cambridge University Press) 59-81. Accessed May 4, 2016.
36 Levey, Zach. n.d. "Anglo-Israeli Strategic Relations." Middle Eastern Studies (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 31. Accessed May 7, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283761.
37 Varble, Derrek. 2014. The Suez Crisis. Osprey. Accessed May 6, 2016.
38 West, Gordon. 1957. "OPERATION MUSKETEER." Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994) 34.
39 Merry, Wayne. 2006. "The Ghost of Suez." American Conservative 20.
40 Holland, Matthew. 2011. The Suez Canal. NC. Accessed May 7, 2016.
41 Dooley, Howard J. 2013. "Great Britain`s `Last Battle` in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the SuezCrisis of 1956." The International History Review (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 11: 486-517. Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106046.
42 Collins, Brian C. 2011. "Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956." Small Wars Journal (Small Wars Foundation.). Accessed May 6, 2016.
43 Richardson, Louise. 2016. International Journal (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 47: 370-401. Accessed May 6, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202764.
44 Browne, O`Brien. 2005. "Long shadow of the Suez Crisis." The Quarterly Journal of Military History 74.
45 Browne, O`Brien. 2005. "Long shadow of the Suez Crisis." The Quarterly Journal of Military History 74.
46 Merry, Wayne. 2006. "The Ghost of Suez." American Conservative 20.
47 Dietl, Ralph. 2008. "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?" Journal of Contemporary History 259-278.
48 Doley, Haward J. 2013. "Great Britain`s `Last Battle` in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the SuezCrisis of 1956." The Review of International History (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 11: 486-517. Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106046.