Negotiation in six party talks regarding the issue of North Korea’s Nuclear Program essay

The dangerous practice of acquiring nuclear capabilities prior to bargaining in order to take advantage of our commitment to world security and peace in order to extort compensation as a precursor to denuclearizing have ominously become prevalent in the world. North Korea ‘s detonation of a warhead last October cast a shadow over the multilateral negotiating effort sponsored by China called the Six-Party Talks to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. Pessimists believe North Korea will not give up the nuclear weapons it already possesses any time soon, if ever.

Even optimists agree that finding the right package of incentives to induce Pyongyang to disarm and dismantle its nuclear programs has become more difficult. The unpredictable behavior of the socialist DRPK in six-party talk remains a major challenge and the use of preemptive military power is a distant option as such action could lead to terrorist outfits taking advantage of the resultant instability to acquire nuclear bombs. North Koreans believe their detonation of a nuclear device will force the US to agree to North Korea’s demands: a phased, give-and-take resolution of its nuclear weapon’s program.

North Korea prefers a slow progression of denuclearization so as to pursue two long term objectives: reducing its dependency on China and South Korea by improving and expanding its relations with the US and Japan and to acquire an equal footing with US in security terms. The process of denuclearization must gain a promising start in the forthcoming negotiations as Washington, Beijing and Seoul may not be able to provide concerted leadership during late 2007 and 2008 in order to apply decisive pressure ceasing a nuclear program. Talks may drag forward until mid-2009 when a new US administration might possibly refresh the initiative.

During this time, Seoul and Washington would be preoccupied with their presidential elections in 2007 and 2008 and Beijing will be preoccupied with the 2008 Olympics. North Korea was ultimately rewarded for its peace threatening act following its release of $25 million frozen assets with an additionally voluminous South Korean cargo already on its way carrying 65000 tons composite fertilizer. Taking a very patient stand on North Korea’s provocative act, America has diluted its demand for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North’s nuclear program.

It has now come to agree to achieve a freeze of nuclear development in return for a promise of extended compensation as their persistence and detonation has forced US to agree on our long time stand: a phased, give and take resolution of nuclear weapons program. The foremost priority now is getting North Korea to cease operation of its five megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon which continues to produce weapons grade plutonium instead of its maximal focus on complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament of North’s nuclear program (CVID). The Bush administration has shown extraordinary patience during recent meetings.

In this round, the first since North Korea’s detonation of a nuclear device, meetings continued when American objective at these talks was to achieve a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear development in return for a promise of extended compensation. The final harvest is envisioned to be at the end of 2008 with the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Our Goals The only way to significantly increase our knowledge and understanding of North Korean capabilities and intentions is to conduct bilateral talks with them on a regular basis.

The points to be covered in bilateral talks include: 1. Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula 2. Normalizing Diplomatic Relations between US and North Korea 3. Normalizing Relations Between Japan and North Korea 4. Economic and Energy Co-operation 5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism 6. Review Progress After Last Meet in March 2007 7. Strengthening Democracy in Far East Diagnosis of the situation 1. U. S. National Interests in the Region.

The United States has three enduring national security interests and objectives: ensuring U. S. security and freedom; honoring international commitments; and contributing to global economic well-being through security, access, and productivity. • Maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia is a vital U. S. interest because the American way of life and economic well-being are connected to free trade with three of our top seven world-wide trading partners located in the region: Japan, China, and the ROK. • The United States must visibly demonstrate commitment to its defense treaties in the region: the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK, the 1960 U. S. -Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U. S. commitment to the ROK-U. S. and Japan-U. S. alliances.

• Maintaining a nuclear-free Korean peninsula facilitates peace and stability in a potentially volatile region where the possibility exists for large-scale conventional and nuclear military competition. Such competition would affect the global economy and threaten the physical well-being of the United States and its vital allies. • Preventing North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation protects not only allies in the region, but allies in other regions and, additionally, the US domestic territory by ensuring that WMD proliferation does not expand into terrorist hands.

In light of these interests, one clear objective presents itself: the “fast and verifiable dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. ” During the end of the Cold War, the United States entered into arms control and security agreements with the Soviet Union that did not require the United States to prop up the Soviet regime. Logically, North Korea should not expect concessions that the United States was unwilling to grant to the Soviet Union at the height of Cold War tensions.