Leadershipand Command: General William E Depuy and General Gerhard Johann Davidvon Scharnhorst.
Discussand analyze key leadership elements of General William E Depuy and,General Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst. How does this analysisshape your view of leadership?
GeneralGerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) was a PrussianGeneral notable for his military prowess, leadership skills duringthe Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars he is notable due to thereforms he introduced to the Prussian army. Armies of the variousstates came to know him well such that he received many offers totransfer his services. Johann received a patent of nobility from KingFredrick William III of Prussia for his skills1it is after this that the Prussian Military Academy employed him forinstructional work. During the 1806 war, Johann served as chief ofthe general staff at which war the Prussian army retreated by orderof his stern resolution.
Therelevance of Johann in relation to command and leadership is creditedto his good reputation of being a good military writer scholar andabove all in being a successful commander. During his service in themilitary under various posts he proved he was an officer on fire andhis leadership skills were recognized during the deadly Napoleonicwars. Johann believed that leaders must lead by example and that forone to become a leader they must prove themselves with their actions.Thus qualification and merit was the only way to be promotednevertheless it is his intellectual idea and proper understanding ofthe warfares led his army to defeating Napoleon.
Onthe other hand, General William E Depuy (1919-1992) is said to be oneof the most influential military officers in the twentieth century. He is also considered as being one of the leading participants in thearchitecture of restructuring the US Army doctrine after thewithdrawal of America from Vietnam.2He is recognized for having developed the training program and thedeclaration command which regenerated the army. The program isnevertheless in use today, and it is used as an education anddevelopment program for the military training.
GeneralDepuy’s relevance to command and leadership is in respect of theway he handled his army during the post-Vietnam War. When he was acommander, he was part and parcel of the team that innovated andcreated a new fighting doctrine in the US Army.3Though his training and development ideas sparked debates andregarded as controversial by some, they later became widelyacceptable practices under the name AirLand Battle Doctrine.4
Thetwo army officers have been paired together due to their exceptionalwork in their military service. They both believed in the developmentand emphasized the importance of changes in their respectiveservices. In this regard, it is right to consider the two officers asdirect, skillful, courageous and above all intelligent. Theconsideration is due to their success in their respective missionswhich they emerged as courageous leaders.
Inmy opinion, despite the two leaders having undergone throughcomplexities, they demonstrated and set high intelligence levels inthe military leadership roles, for instance, Depuy believed that hedidn`t have to wait for information to come to him, but ratherbelieved in private study and observations. He was a self-starter anda great thinker however one of his weaknesses is that he did nothave high regards for schools. He was of the opinion that schools didnot help much, and they were for the less talented and the lessdriven. Similarly, Johann`s strengths included being a great thinkerand an intellectual that he laid down the foundations for thedevelopment of the German armed forces as a professional institution.
Natureand Character of War
Depuyserved in the National Guard and ROTC in 1941 where his firstassignment was in the 20thinfantry at Fort Leonard Wood. He was later moved to the 90thdivision infantry division in Europe. It is while in this divisionthat he prepared for the liberation of Europe It is also during thisperiod that Depuy saw what leadership incompetence caused to thearmy. Insufficient training and poor leadership led to many soldiersdying and others being injured.5
Depuy’sgoal and dedication were directed at leadership development hisemphasis on the importance of training in the army was also driven bythe fact that he believed that he had received inadequate trainingduring war preparations. Precisely, in June and July 1944, the 90thdivision fight through the hedgerows of Normandy provided Depuy witha profound lesson. He was of the opinion that the situation was sobad such that the commander in the Normandy war was as "as closeto being totally incompetent as it is possible to be`.6In this regard, it is true to say that Depuy`s experiences in theArmy shaped his way of looking at things, it opened his eyes to seewhat was being done wrong and what needed to be done to make thingsright in the army.7His dedication to the noble objective saw him being involved indecision-making situations that caused changes in the training,structure of the force, command doctrine as well as the policydevelopment.
Hisleadership skills saw his military career bear eloquent testimony hewas decisive and skillful and given the nature and character of the1944 and 1945 war, he is said to have appeared as one of the mostexperienced and successful battalion commander produced by the war.He was successful because as a leader, he was courageous and led thearmy without fear and any doubts that they would come back homevictorious.
Onthe other hand, GerhardJohann David Waitz von Scharnhorst is credited for being highlyeffective as well as emerging victorious even when his enemiesoutnumbered his Prussian army. Johann out his intelligence devisedthe shrinkage system whereby the army recruits were being trained andsent to reserves to give space for more men to be trained as well.This system helped in increasing the number of trained soldiers.8
Johannbecame a general during the Napoleonic wars, at a time when hedistinguished himself as an effective leader. He had been takenprisoner after their failure in the Battle of Jena in the 1806-1807periods it was after his release in the campaigns that he wasappointed as the head of the commission which was to investigate thereforms needed for the transformation of the Prussian Army.
Thechanges were meant to transform the army of Prussia from atraditional one to a national army based on the universal service. Inessence, promotions were based on merit, military administrationstructure was rationalized, systems of punishments for militarycrimes were reformed, and there was also the creation of armyreserves. In his leading the commission to achieve all these changes,it is prudent to say that Johann`s leadership skills were impressive.
Beinga minister for war and the head of the military reconstructioncommission brings him out as an artillery officer who through hisskills, intelligence and courage urged his government to take up arevenge mission against Napoleon. Napoleon failed to conquer Russiaand retreated for long to Moscow9this gave the Prussian Army a chance to prove themselves in thebattle against the French. Johann as a leader was able to reconstructthe Prussian army allowing it to be better placed in handling theconflicts as well as making it a universal military service.
TheFrench revolution was influential both socially and politically oneof the main changes that came about was the overthrowing of themonarchy and the establishment of the Republic. Napoleon carriedforward this revolution during the later French empire expansion.During these violent periods, there was political mayhem which wasaccelerated by Napoleon’s dictatorship principles.
Therevolutionary wars had the objective of doing away with the absolutemonarchies and replacing them with republics. There were globalconflicts triggered by these events which are regarded as the mostimportant in human history.10The Napoleonic wars brought revolutionary changes to Europe conquestin the French empire brought about changes and features includingdemocracy, reduction of the power of the Catholic Church as well asfostering the culture of due process in courts. In this regard, therewas a rise in commerce and industrialization throughout Europe.
Someof the political solutions that ensued after the Napoleonic warsinclude the spread of nationalism and creation of new movements. Thewars shaped most of the European history in essence, it spelled theend and beginning of some states due to the European map changingyears after the Napoleonic era. In this case, Prussia was restored inits previous borders and also received large pieces Saxony andPoland. In this regard, though Johann died before the Napoleonic warscould end, he was a key participant the defeat of Napoleon havinggone even a step further to urge his government to lounge revengeagainst him (Napoleon). National ideologies replaced the aristocracythat had been the primary rule of Napoleon. Also, legacies ofinstitutions remained in the form of civil law which has clearlydefined codes of law these are Napoleon codes.
Onthe other hand, Depuy’s participation in the Vietnam War was toestablish a government structure that was cohesive. The operationallevel of the war developed to remove politics from an inherentlypolitical process.11The defeat of the US Army in Vietnam led to many officers blaminginterference from the civilians. In this regard, the operationallevel of war developed with a motive of limiting politics in whatthey considered their domain.12
Itwas after the Vietnam War that Depuy’s efforts to reform becameintense especially on training and enforcing the leader developmentdoctrine. The character of the Yom Kippur war was lethal in such away that they had to prepare for the next battle thoroughly. It is inthis spirit that officers had to train for the wars Depuy did thisby curtailing outside educational opportunities for the officers andinstead being urged to focus on the tactical level.
TheUS Army defined its mission in the post-Vietnam world whereby thepolitical involvement was limited. The limitation meant that theofficers would be free of political interferences. In this regard,the Army was said to be better placed to know the force to use andmake their decisions solely and objectively.
Depuy’sarmy was haunted by their failure at the Vietnam War the militaryvowed that it would restore its credibility with the American peopleand its government. In this regard, the leaders had to examine thehistory of wars especially the World War I and the World War II intheir joint efforts to make sense of the science behind conflicts.13
Inessence, it was concluded that the army being an instrument of powerof the nation, there was need to concentrate on how to equip ittechnologically. Yom Kippur War saw the use of technology in thebattle which was a success under the leadership of Depuy. Thisclearly showed that an army that is high-tech prepared to face aconflict is better placed than an army that is just numericallysuperior.
Thisway, the need to modernize their weapons was considered which was tohelp the in their large scale conflicts. In any case, operationallevel of armies is central in creation of military relationships inthis regard, it was the role of the operational commander totranslate the strategies to be used to his junior commanders. This isvital because it covers the purpose of the operational levelcommanders who are tasked to ensure that the actions taken haveachieved the strategic objectives.
Onthe other hand, Johann as an intellectual understood the importanceof unity in the army against their enemies. In his thorough reformshe introduced a permanent general staff who was well conversant withthe reorganization of the educational system of the Prussia military.His mind which was the foundation of his military intellectualleadership was always at work thinking of what could be done for thearmy to improve in their battles.
Hebelieved in collective efforts both in creating strategies and alsowhen in the field. The concept of Unity of effort is addressed inmultinational coalitions Johann recognized the efficiency in theunity of force as opposed to the union of command. It was a realitythat operations in a world of coalitions, private organizations andtrans-governmental agencies all have common goals which are in linewith the military objectives.14In this regard, it is prudent to note that the coalitions must haveexplored their relationship statuses with respect to the doctrinaland tactical differences. This way they will be in a position to knowwhether they are well paired and whether their difference will havean effect on their unity of effort.
Duringthe Napoleonic wars, these relationships were utilized, the dynamicsof these coalitions were seen which happened to be shifty dependingon the specific war. During the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen (1813),the Prussian Army utilized the tactical and doctrinal mechanisms. Inessence, it proved to have paid off given the fact that they emergedvictorious. Nevertheless, it would be inevitable to mention thatmultinational coalitions should be considered when it comes towarfares which are beyond a nation`s borders.
Strategicand Military Culture
Fora person to have much influence in the military institution, he mustbe hardworking, brainy and must implore sheer dedication. GeneralDepuy had blended these characteristics given that he left such arich legacy in the military in his doings and works, Depuy depictedenthusiasm in his military career. Warfare is a human endeavor thatis fought by people using their minds.15In this regard, wars must be fought against using very calculativemoves and ideas. Depuy was intelligent thereby fostering a culture ofmission command.
Theculture that was there in the army was such that the values andtraits being passed to the young officers could not put them in aposition to play key roles in the battlefields. Depuy emphasized ontraining and working together this way, the army was able to developrelationships among themselves which would enable them to worktogether as a team. This, in any case, reflected on the culture ofhaving a straight system for instance promoting the right people topositions, and working on the right kind of ideas.
Inthis regard, Depuy was of the opinion that in not concentrating withtraining of the officers then the army’s ability to be successfulin the battlefields would be limited. Being a product of the USArmy’s success in the World War II as well as the Vietnams failure,Depuy had a good chance in becoming the principal architect of thefirst post-Vietnam Army doctrine. This doctrine and his experiencesled him to the belief that the army must be renewed for it to beuseful in the future wars. He endorsed and fostered the culture ofhaving military objectives that reflects the vital nationalinterests.16
Onthe other hand, Johann had described himself as Napoleons’ mostactive enemy he had a passion for national building and thus usedthis as motivation to avenge Napoleon in the Napoleonic wars. Johannbelieved that their self-perception was key in defeating Napoleon inessence, Johann believed that masses could make impressions andobtain excellent results and outcomes. It is in this spirit that here-established and transformed the Prussian army. He instilled in hisofficers the spirit of dealing with issues intellectually Napoleon`sinfluential ideas and decisions had destroyed the professional systemof the Prussian army and thus Johann`s decision to upgrade themilitary and their war-fighting abilities.
Theculture and values of the German army had to be switched givenNapoleon`s spreading of his war philosophies. Johann exercised enoughinfluence to see that Napoleon suffered political blows this washeightened in 1812 when Johann paved way for the agreement where thethen commander of the Prussian army General von Yorch , concluded apact of neutrality with the Russian commander. In this regard, it wascatastrophic for Napoleon thus leading to his stripping of hispolitical power.
Johannfight for military conscription and the establishment of the nationalmilitia, Landwehr, were put in place. This meant that Prussian armycould field a large army and given the political transformation thathad happened, defeating Napoleon would be easy. In this spirit ofhaving new strategies and changed policies, his efforts paid off withthe Prussian army victory in 1813 at the Battle of Leipzig. TheNapoleonic wars were finally over. It is thus prudent to point outthat if it had not been for Johanns’ intellectual strategies in thefight against the Napoleon, then Napoleons’ influence would havegone deep which would have affected the current generations. It isthrough changes in the military leadership and command policies thatled to the Prussian army`s victory by driving the Napoleon army tothe boarders from the fields of central Europe.
Resourcingand Sustaining War
Oneof the most important principles that Johann utilized during hisfights in wars included always conducting operations elastically andresourcefully and giving every possible scope to the initiative andself-sufficiency of commanders at all levels. In this notice, it isright to say that the army and all the staff adhered to the twoleadership principles this led to their victory despite a series ofcrises.17The fact that the eighteenth century wars were fought for dynamicinterests, the conflicts were on a global scale which in any casethey were viewed in terms of the continental, state power andcolonial wars.
Europeanglobal power was increasing which meant that the resources also hadto be allocated carefully lest they ran out. Also, the alliancescultivated to permit the pursuit of dynastic claims in Europe whichhad commerce opportunities. Nevertheless, even the temporalcoalitions for instance in 1772 between Russia, Austria and Prussia,and between Austria and Russia in 1787 did not manage to createenduring relationships in the European regions. This was quitedetrimental as sustaining the war was proving to be hard.
Prussiain their fight against the Napoleonic wars was made difficult partlydue to lack of resources the army only interpreted short termalliances which hampered their ability to provide a united front asagainst Napoleon. This was also the case for Austria, Britain andRussia. The only marriages/alliances that lasted beyond the period ofthe conflicts included France and Spain at the start of theeighteenth century era as well as Austria and France at mid-century. In essence, the biggest advantage that Britain had against Napoleonwas the fact that Britain had financial resources, they had a bankingsystem which could sustain the war. In any case, Britain was thepre-eminent world center of finance, and they had been the onesfinancing most of the coalitions against the Napoleonic wars throughthe First World War was more expensive than the Napoleonic wars.
Onthe other hand, Depuy as a commander of the new doctrine, U.S ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), he was in charge of theconditions that it would be run. A new operations manual was requiredespecially after their Vietnam painful defeat. In essence, this meantmore resources were needed to sustain their new battlefieldsstrategies. For instance, the doctrine required commanders who wouldsupervise their operations which included close, deep and rear.
Also,the reserves which Depuy put heavy importance on needed resources tosustain it as they were also involved in deep surveillance and airinterdiction of their enemies. Due to their minimal resources, Depuyhad to use brainy strategies, for instance, use of a trained andready peacetime force which would effectively help in their fightagainst their numerically superior enemies. The doctrine requiredcommanders to seize the initiative from the enemy given that theywould make use of the mechanized force. Nevertheless, the in-depthoperations still required time and resources so that they could keeptheir enemies off balance.
Thoughthe doctrine was expensive to sustain, it helped in defining both theproper equipment for its effective execution as well as defining theorganization of military units for battle. The doctrine expressed thegrowth of technology as an eminent threat which led to therequirement of the new equipment to meet the threat without hitches.Depuy emerged as an intellectual and effective leader having foughtthe battle and survived even though their enemies outnumbered them.
Inhis position as a leader, he pointed out that the resource managementorganization of the army was unresponsive to the Army`s needs and thenew doctrine in reaction to this he went the extra mile to have theorganization broken up, and their functions reassigned to a forcescommand. This brings out Depuy’s courageousness in his dealings asa leader he was ready to make those decisions that no one was up toit even if it meant being at loggerheads with some individuals thishowever was all done in respect of the greater good of the army.
Geographyand the Operational Environment
Militarycommanders should have the capacity intellectually to evaluate theland geography as well as the operational environment for themilitary to successfully prosecute the war. This theme was wellbrought out by General Depuy in his position as the US Army commanderduring the Vietnam War. The operational environment is one factorthat crucially dictates the tactics and the force that the armyshould use. One of the main effects of geographical terrain and theenvironment is that movement may be restricted and the commander’soptions may be limited.
Inthis regard, an intelligent commander must be aware of the terrainand know which of the limited options should be embarked on by hisarmy. Two wars that show clearly how land factors can affect the waroutcomes are the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In the Korean War,the land is the one that needed to be defended while in the VietnamWar the US Army had to protect a border which was seven hundred milesaway rather than securing a border that was a hundred miles away.18This is because the further border was more useful to the enemies inthat it was used in the movement of materials and men who wouldlaunch assaults into the country. Also, the weather conditions wereextreme the vegetation was thick and the terrain was mountainous.
Inthis regard, the Vietnam terrain dictated the position of forces aswell as the tactics that the military used. The Vietnam Terraincontributed to the eventual outcome of the war whereby General Depuyand his army were defeated. The US did not have enough troops tocover the big Vietnam border in essence, their failure was caused bythe land geography, in which case they could not control the flow oftroops and supplies on one side of the border. It is, therefore,practical to conclude that commanders must learn the regionalgeography of the war so that they have an appropriate way ofapproaching the war.
Onthe other hand, the Napoleonic wars were also affected bygeographical and environmental factors. Geographic information mustnot be a tool description in such a way that it becomes useless in anoperational level war, and it should not be restricted to thespecific and local elements of tactical terrain analysis. Napoleon’sdefeat in Russia was caused by several reasons including poordiscipline, diseases as well as the weather. His operationalenvironment was a concentration of his forces in one key place todestroy his enemy who failed in Russia.19Also, one of the geographical features that caused his defeat was theclimate despite the long distances and the sheer scale of thecountry, his horses also died due to the exertion in the intensesummer heat.
Inaddition, the winter struck after the Russians set fire to Napoleonslodgings such that they neither had food nor shelter. It is in thissituation of having to face harsh the environments that Napoleondecided to retreat soldiers had also died due to starvation in thefrozen environment. During winter, the march was slow due to roadswhich were quagmires of mud Rivers needed bridges to be crossed allof which required energy, of which the soldiers did not have due tostarvation. Many soldiers died in their sleep due to exhaustion andlack of food.20 In this regard, from a geographical standpoint, a matter of longdistances and a route through lands that had less agriculturaloutputs was a major blow to Napoleons army which ultimately led totheir defeat. In this spirit, a commander must have knowledge of thegeographical terrain as well as the environmental factors that mayaffect their objective in a war.
TheVietnam War left the US army in an atrocious shape including lack oforganizational focus in this regard, General Depuy’s focus was toreshape the army into a more fine and prepared military force. He didthis after his promotion to being a general where he was in charge oftraining and command (TRADOC). In his position, his main aim was tosee that professionalism was regained among the officers. If anyofficer was not able to do what was expected of him, General Depuywas not shy in relieving them their duties.
Itis evident that Depuy’s mission was not only to make the armyefficient, but I was also to prepare them for the future challenges.He put all his efforts to make sure that the military recovered fromthe Vietnam blow which had been accompanied by social problems, rapidexpansion, and contraction as well as other hardships. It was underDepuy’s command that they realized they do not have to be many innumbers to defeat their enemy, but rather they could just be wise andbe sharp in their strategies for them to be successful on thebattlefield.
Inessence, it was under General Depuy, that the basis of the modernAmerican Military was created. It has been regarded as thebest-trained army in the world as well as the most technologicallycapable with a huge budget and a popular backing at home. He valuedcompetency and was of the opinion that competency in the leadershipranks would be key in enhancing the efficiency of the army.Promotions under his command were on merit and also fired those heopined did not meet the leadership criteria. In this regard, GeneralDepuy was feared by many while other believed that he was arrogantand sought of a tyrant. Nevertheless, his intellect and leadershiphelped fashion the organization using new fighting doctrine as wellas resurrecting the army’s morale and spirits to face challenges inthe post-Vietnam War era.
Onthe other hand, General Johann was noted for his military theoriesand his leadership efficiency in the Napoleonic wars. It was underhis leadership and command as the General that reforms were made tothe army the reforms reorganized the army in such a way that it wasable to liberate Prussia from the French domination.
Inhis leadership position, he introduced permanent general staff whohad to be intensely intertwined with the organization of the Prussianeducational system. He was intelligent and always calculated hismoves before he could make the decisions.21He believed that the army needed intellectual enhancement so that itcould handle future challenges with professionalism. He also believedin quality leadership thus embarked on his mission of instituting thegeneral staff. Johann praised education and thought that an armyofficer must be in a position to use their mind in the right way,judge correctly and in a conclusive manner the mathematics of thewar, if this does not happen then even the accumulated experience inthe army will not help him. In this regard, he fostered the spirit ofwanting to read and learn among the officers so that they do notgradually become inactive and idle.
Duringthe Napoleonic wars, Johann exhibited himself as courageous and afearless leader he did not appreciate the defeats that the Prussianarmy faced and thus embarked on a revenge mission against Napoleon.Under his leadership and command, the army was able to defeatNapoleon though he died before their last victorious battle.
Theone advantage that is associated with war planning is that it putsthe enemy in danger of losing everything and the planner in a secureposition without risks. General Johann was keen in analyzing whathad happened previously during the Prussian defeats by Napoleon. Hewas intelligent and was therefore able to see the loopholes that werein the Prussian army. He had also studied Napoleon and his strategiesduring his campaigns he had realized that though he had goodtactics, he was not innovative in his plans.
Johannthereby planned to use his weakness against him he embarked on arevenge mission which had been designed based on Napoleonsbattlefields tactics. Napoleons strategies were all based onmobility, flexibility and speed he always knew his intended point ofattack. General Johann in his planning included a lot of learningespecially in educating the young officers whom he urged to improvetheir professional and common knowledge in courses for instancecampaign tactics, geographical and terrain sketching as well asmilitary engineering.22In his mind, while working on the attack plan, he knew that theeducated and professional generals would merge their intellectualideas and come up with superior tactics and strategies to maneuverthrough challenges in the battlefields. It was after his plans hadbecome concrete that he embarked on his mission to finish Napoleon.
Onthe hand, Depuy was involved much in the post-Vietnam Wardecision-making strategies in this case, he spent most of his yearsplanning and training. In had seen what poor leadership and poorplanning could do to an army as well as the whole nation. In hisposition as the General, Depuy had an opportunity to transform thearmy as well as make it ready for their next missions.23In the training sessions, Depuy always had a master plan of wherethey would deploy this way their operations were in such a way thatthey were calculated and well thought.
Depuy,being a leader, was a key player in the plan executions which turnedto be successful. In essence joint operations could in most casesinvolve a lot of thinking and analysis of the whole strategy
TheVietnam War, which was a personal affair on a national scale, was anepic fail for the US the war period is said to be a disgrace to thenation which was filled with blood and extremely dark days. Theperiod implores personal and national lessons. For instance, somelost their families while the national taxes and resources went towaste. The effects of the war are still felt years after the warsome of the people who survived the war are several veterans who nowhave to live with their shattered lives and physical disabilities.They have had difficulties in adapting to the civilian life. The warin intense in such a way that it would prove difficult to adjustingto the post-war also there are very few groups to help them in theirtransformation from battle to home.24
Themilitary lessons included learning effective military thoughts,changes that could be used effectively in the future missions. Thislearning and changes are incorporated in the doctrine, it wouldbecome fashionable and ultimately would turn out to be a generalpractice. It is said that armies have three opportunities to learnwhich include personal battle experience, history of self and othersand lastly the other soldiers` experiences. One of the majoradaptations of the military includes knowing how to deal with suchwars as well as challenges that may be similar. They also learn howto avoid such conflicts in the future.
TheNapoleonic Wars has lessons that involved strategies and tacticsNapoleon is said to be a war genius and a great tactician who gaveeveryone a run for their money. One of the major lessons learned fromthe wars is that before an attack, good planning is a must so thatthere is no confusion during the attacks. It would be prudent to doresearch well before embarking on a battle. This means that leadersshould project ideas that they know will success, however if it failsit doesn’t mean that that is the end of the world.
Inconclusion, Johann and Depuy are obviously two leaders who broughtchanges in their respective positions as leaders of their respectiveorganizations. It is quite commendable to be remembered as a veteranor a founder of a doctrine that has helped successive missions. Theyboth exhibited leadership roles that anyone who wants to be a leadermust learn. They were intelligent and it was through their greatideas and philosophies that made them great and efficient in whatthey embarked on.
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1 White, Charles E. (1989) The enlightened soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805. New York : Praeger
2 Wilson, Jeffrey S. (2011) Transformational leadership: William DePuyâs vision for the army. Military Review, Vol. 91, no. 5, Sept-Oct, pp. 70-77.
3 Gole, Henry G. (2008) The relevance of Gen. William E, DePuy. Army, Vol. 58, no. 3, March, pp. 66-68, 70, 72-74.
4 DePuy, William E. (1994) Selected papers of General William E. DePuy: first commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute.
5 Ibid,, 4
7 Vandergriff, Donald E. 2002. Path to victory: America`s army and the revolution in human affairs. Novato, Calif: Presidio Press.
8 Rosinski, Herbert. (1976) Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: the rise and decline of German military thought. Naval War College Review, Vol. 29, no. 1, Summer, pp. 83-103
9 Haythornthwaite, Philip J., and Bryan Fosten. 1987. The Russian army of the Napoleonic wars (2): Cavalry, 1799-1814. London: Osprey Pub.
10 Demeter, Karl. (1965) The German Officer-Corps in Society and State 1650-1945. New York : Weidenfeld & Nicolson
11 McGrew, Matthew A. Politics and the Operational Level of War. No. ATZL-SWV. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, 2011.
12 Association of the United States Army. 1950. Army. Washington: Association of the United States Army].
13 Norton, Michael A. (1997) Operational leadership in Vietnam: General William Depuy vs Lieutenant General Victor Krulak or attrition vice pacification. Newport, RI : Naval War College
14 White, Charles E. 1988. The enlightened soldier Scharnhorst and the "Militärische Gesellschaft" in Berlin, 1801 – 1805. Ann Arbor, Mich: U.M.I.
15 Brownlee, Romie L. (1988) Changing an army an oral history of General William E, DePuy, USA retired. Washington, D.C. : United States Army of Military History.
16 Gole, Henry G. 2008. General William E. Depuy preparing the Army for modern war. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=792134.
17 Ibid 13
18 Willbanks, James H. 2006. The Vietnam War. Burlington, VT [u.a.]: Ashgate.
19 Margiotta, Franklin D. 1994. Brassey`s encyclopedia of military history and biography. Washington u.a: Brassey`s.
20 Gersdorff, Rudolf-Christoph, and David C. Isby. 2004. Fighting the breakout: the German Army in Normandy from COBRA to the Falaise Gap. London: Greenhill.
21 Beaumont, Keaton L. Developing 21st Century Senior Leaders. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2010.
22 Tucker, Spencer C. (2015) 500 great military leaders: Volume 2: L-Z. Santa Barbara, Calif. : ABC-CLIO
23 Craig, Gordon A. (1955) The politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945. London : OUP943.08 POL
24 Davis, Robert T. (2008) The challenge of adaptation the US Army in the aftermath of conflict, 1953-2000. Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute Press.